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Abstract
This paper provides a normative framework based on cooperative game theory aimed at
studying the problem of pollution responsibility allocation across multi-tier supply chains.
The model is further developed with reference to the case of a linear supply chain, by using
three responsibility principles (namely: Upstream, Downstream and Local Responsibility).
Allocation rules are derived; also, desirable properties in terms of fairness, efficiency and
transparency are introduced, in order to characterize such rules. Furthermore, a stability
concept for efficient allocations is formulated. An example of a possible application of the
introduced cost allocation rules is provided.
Keywords Supply chains · Pollution responsibility allocation · Game theory · Shapley value
1 Introduction
The promotion of environmental sustainability has become crucial in the implementation and
day-to-day functioning of complex and global supply networks. A growing number of large
multi-national enterprises are implementing more stringent environmental practices; this has
also an impact on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which are often involved in
their supply networks (UN Global 2011).
The promotion of tighter environmental standards also implies the adoption of bench-
marking approaches for comparing the sustainability performances of supply chains against
industry standards. Within this context, Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) methodologies allow
the estimation of cumulative environmental impacts across the entire supply chain and against
a wide range of indicators, adopting a full product life cycle perspective. Within the current
context of growing environmental sustainability, performing an allocation of environmental
impacts to the different actors in the supply chain, with the aim of understanding which of
them should be deemed responsible for polluting activities and related taxes or abatement
costs, is a relevant and timely issue, if proper mitigation measures need to be implemented.
The interest in the topic of environmental pollution responsibility started due to the need to
establish mechanisms to perform pollution burden sharing actions across countries (Zhou and
B Andrea Genovese
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Wang 2016); the related literature has then evolved in order to address allocation problems at
different levels. According to an analysis of the current literature (see, for instance, Zhou and
Wang 2016), most of the available approaches such problems at a macro-level; the application
of pollution responsibilities approaches to contemporary multi-tier and multi-stakeholders
supply chains is often overlooked.
This paper aims at addressing this research gap, by providing a normative framework
based on cooperative game theory aimed at studying the problem of pollution responsibility
allocation across multi-tier supply chains.
The paper is organised as follows. After a review of the literature concerned with pollution
responsibility allocation, and the identification of relevant gaps (Sect. 2), the paper presents
a cooperative game theoretical responsibility model for pollution allocation (Sect. 3). In
Sect. 4, the paper details the generic model in the case of a linear supply chain. In Sect. 5,
a practical application of the introduced cost allocation rules is provided; finally, some
conclusions are drawn.
2 Literature review
The problem of associating pollution responsibilities with economic actors traces its roots
in the international trade literature (Leontief and Ford 1970; Proops et al. 1993; Wyckoff
and Roop 1994; Imura and Moriguchi 1995; Subak 1995; Bosquet 2000; Korhonen 2002;
Bastianoni et al. 2004; Lenzen and Murray 2010). While the interest in the topic started
because of the need to establish mechanisms to perform pollution burden sharing actions
across countries, the related literature has then evolved in order to address allocation problems
at different levels. These include the decomposition of national objectives into regional ones
and the distribution of environmental pollution responsibility across partner firms in a given
supply chain.
One of the fundamental research questions in the field of environmental pollution responsi-
bility has been represented by the allocation principle to be followed. Scholars have developed
different allocation criteria that can be mainly categorized into fairness- and efficiency-
inspired principles. The concept of “fairness” is generally linked to equitable distribution
issues (Rose 1990); the one of “efficiency” is more related to the minimization of costs
related to abatement and mitigation measures. Many emissions allocation methods have
been proposed. According to the extensive review performed by Zhou and Wang (2016), these
can be classified into multiple categories. One of them is the so-called indicator approach.
Through the development of specific indicators, pollution responsibilities, targets or permits
are worked out in relation to these measures. Another stream of studies is devoted to the
use of optimization approaches, which is based on mathematical programming frameworks
for pollution allocation, which try to minimize costs for pollution abatements. For exam-
ple, Ridgley (1996) combed the use of composite indicators and an optimization method for
deriving suitable pollution responsibility allocations at a country level. This rapid scan of the
extant literature, coherently with findings from Zhou and Wang (2016), highlights that most
of the developed approaches deal with the pollution responsibility problem at a macro-level.
Indeed, most of the methodologies tackle the problem at a country or regional level.
While some firm-level approaches can be retrieved, the supply chain perspective has been,
so far, largely ignored, with the few available approaches being characterized by very simple
and naïve models, mainly dealing with dyadic configurations; the application of pollution
responsibilities approaches to contemporary multi-tier and multi-stakeholders supply chains
is often overlooked.
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Pollution allocation mechanisms often include interactions involving multiple actors. As
such, pollution allocation mechanisms may be represented in a very effective way through
approaches based on Game Theory. As stated by Zhou and Wang (2016), game theoretic
approaches seem to be naturally suited for this purpose. Such allocations result from equi-
libria among different parties’ interactions or from values, which may satisfy enjoyable
properties imposed by a central authority. Compared to the traditional approaches for pollu-
tion costs allocation, game theoretic approaches can be deemed as more sophisticated and
less immediate. The use of game theoretic approaches is underexploited, especially when
dealing with complex and multi-tier supply chains. Concepts from cooperative game theory
may assume a normative value, i.e. a value that is imposed by an external authority.
Chander and Tulkens (1995) and Filar and Gaertner (1997) developed the first adaptation
of Game Theory to the problem in order to investigate the allocation of GHGs emission
reductions quota among countries. A similar approach, at an international level, was devel-
oped by Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003), while Germain and Steenberghe (2003) utilized a
dynamic game framework. Viguier et al. (2006) deployed a two-level game for solving a sim-
ilar allocation problem. At a firm level, MacKenzie et al. (2008, 2009) utilized, respectively,
rank-order contests and incomplete information games for allocating pollution allowances.
Chung et al. (2013) utilized dynamic games to evaluate the response of companies to envi-
ronmental pollution taxes in a spatially distributed supply chain. Ren et al. (2015) proposed
a Stackelberg game for studying CO2 reduction targets in a very simple dyadic supply chain.
Surprisingly, the development of normative approaches to pollution cost allocation is less
extensive. A practical applications of the Shapley value approach was developed by Liao
et al. (2015) for allocating emission allowances across energy producers in Shanghai.
2.1 Contribution of the paper
The next section presents a unified cooperative game theoretical approach to pollution respon-
sibility allocation in a multi-tier supply chain. In Sect. 4, the paper details the generic model
in the case of a linear supply chain, by selecting three different responsibility principles
(namely: Upstream, Downstream and Local Responsibility). Also, fairness, efficiency and
transparency properties are introduced, as desirable characteristics for allocation rules; fur-
thermore, a stability concept for efficient allocations is formulated. In particular, here we
present the Shapley value for this unified cooperative game theoretical responsibility model.
In doing this, we find interesting connections between the so-called river problem introduced
by Dong et al. (2012) in the pollution games literature and our framework. The Shapley allo-
cation satisfies many of the mentioned desirable properties.
In Sect. 5, a practical application of the introduced cost allocation rules is provided, with
the reference to the context of dairy supply chains. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
3 Cooperative responsibility models for environmental supply chains
Consider a supply chain of a given product. Such a supply chain can be seen as a set N of
companies engaged, at various stages, in the manufacturing of the product, through sourcing
of raw materials, sub-components manufacturing, assembly activities; such companies can
be indexed in a given order. A set of processes Pi (with |Pi |≤ |N | − 1) can be associated
with each company i . In this context, a process (i , j) represents the production of goods by
company i and the supplying of such goods to company j (with i  j) (as shown in Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1 Structure of a supply chain
network
As such, Pi⊆P, where P 
⋃
i1...n Pi . The set Pi might be empty and this implies that
company i is not supplying goods or services to any supply chain partner. Conversely, the set
Pi might be coinciding with the whole set of processes (i.e., P); this means that company i is
the only supplier in the considered network. Also, each process (i , j) has an environmental
cost that is denoted as ci j . Let C be the set of all environmental costs. Therefore, we build a
mathematical framework as follows:
(N , P , C) (1)
In order to enhance this framework with the concept of environmental responsibility, it can
be useful to introduce a |N | × |P| responsibility matrix B 
(
Bi , p
)
where the row index i
represents companies and the column index p represents processes. Significantly, bi p  1
if company i is responsible (from an environmental point of view) for process p, bi p  0
otherwise. Let Bi be the set of the processes for which company i is responsible from an
environmental point of view, that is Bi 
{
p ∈ P|bi p  1
}
. It is important to recall that the
environmental responsibility of a process may not depend on the physical location of the
process; in other words, bi p can be equal to 1 even if process does not involve physically
company i (in other words, if the company i is not involved as a supplier in this process, or,
alternatively, if the production of goods involved in the process does not happen at company
i premises). Therefore, the framework (1) can be rewritten as (N , P , B, C), where B is the
responsibility matrix. The quantity
∑
p∈Bi cp can be interpreted as an intuitive cost allocation
for company i , summing up all the environmental costs of processes p for which company i
is deemed responsible. A coalition responsibility set can be defined as BS  ∪i∈S Bi ; then,
the social cost function for each sub-group of companies S ⊆ N can be defined as follows:
v(S) 
∑
p∈Bs
cp (2)
The sum v(S) in the formula (2) represents the environmental cost of all the processes for
which at least one company belonging to the set S is responsible. Moreover, each cost is
counted only once as different companies may be responsible for the same process.1 Being
1 The environmental cost function can be also defined as v(S) 
∑
s∈S
∑
(i , j)∈Bs/⊔s−1t1 Bt
ci j in an equivalent
way.
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N , by definition, a finite set, ν : 2N → R is a function which associates a real value with each
subset of N . Following a classical definition, (N , ν) represents a cooperative game with a
characteristic function. N also represents the set of players; each subset of the set of players
is called a coalition; ν is called the characteristic function of the game.
In this case, the characteristic function v is defined through the above-introduced elements
P , B and C , therefore leading to the following model:
G  (N , P , B, C , v) (3)
Such cooperative games are defined in terms of a characteristic function, which specifies the
outcomes that each coalition can achieve for itself. Outcomes are specified in terms of the
total utility/cost that a coalition can get and distribute across its members. By assuming the
formation of a grand coalition, the main aim of such games is the definition of a solution
concept, which allocates costs among each player from N .
In a supply chain context, it can be fair assuming that companies cooperate (by forming
a grand coalition) in order to coordinate the activities of the production system. This way,
they will incur in different individual production costs because of initial binding agreements
among partners; also, they will face costs related to the mitigation of the environmental
impacts of their production activities. Cooperative game theory can provide solutions to
allocate environmental pollution impacts across each member of the production system, by
allowing transferable payments among companies.
In this study, the main aim is to identify a vector x  (xi ) ∈ R|N |+ representing a solution
to the cooperative model (2), which assigns the cost xi to each company i .
An allocation is responsible-compatible when, if Bi is empty, then xi is null. In the follow-
ing, we will always refer to allocations which respect the responsible-compatible principle.
An allocation is efficient if the sum of all cost-allocations, i.e.
∑|N|
i1 xi , is equal to the
sum of all costs, i.e.
∑|N |
i1
∑|N |
j1 ci j .
2
3.1 Desirable properties for cost allocation rules
Cost allocation rules should respect some desirable properties that have been described in the
environmental pollution responsibility literature. In the following, we list and discuss each
of these properties; we remark that some of these have been already listed in Gopalakrishnan
et al. (2016), while and some of them are novel.
Property 1: Equivalence If two companies i and j are responsible for the same processes,
then they must have the same cost allocation. Therefore, if Bi  B j then xi  x j must be
satisfied for any i and j ∈ N .
Property 2: Equal sharing of extra pollution This property provides fairness to the allocation
of extra costs that might arise as the result of additional polluting activities (that could happen
over time). If there is an increase in total pollution costs, it is required that companies
responsible for this increase should be equally affected by extra burdens.
As a preliminary definition, it can be stated that C′≥C if and only if cij ′≥ cij for any i ,
j ∈ N. We say that C′>C if C′≥C and there exists a process (i , j) ∈ P such that cij ′>cij Let
G  (N , P , B, C , v), G ′ 
(
N , P , B, C ′, v
)
be the two associated cooperative models
where C and C′ are two sets of environmental costs with C′≥C. If i , j ∈ N are responsible
2 We will denote an allocation xi of the cooperative model G by x(G)  (xi (G)) ∈ R
|N |
+ .
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for any process p, that is bi , p  b j , p  1 where p ∈ P is characterized by cp′>cp. Then
the following equality xi
(
G ′
)
− xi (G)  x j
(
G ′
)
− x j (G) must be satisfied.
Property 3: No free riding The equal sharing of extra pollution property (introduced above
as Property 2) does not guarantee the efficiency of such net cost increase re-allocation. In
other words, the property does not require that the sum of extra charges for responsible
companies is equal to the net increase of the pollution costs across the supply chain. As such,
Property 3 provides an additional efficiency requirement to the above-mentioned situation.
This property requires that if the total pollution costs increase, but, at the same time, for
some firms the pollution of the processes they are responsible for remains unchanged, the
allocation for these firms should remain the same.
Let G  (N , P , B, C , v) and G ′ 
(
N , P , B, C ′, v
)
be the two associated cooperative
models where C, C′ are two sets of environmental costs with C′≥C. Let i ∈ N; suppose that
c′p  cp for each process p satisfying bi , p  1. Then, the equality xi
(
G ′
)
 xi (G) must be
satisfied.
Property 4: Process independence Suppose that a single process p increases its pollution
cost cp; as a consequence, cost allocations across the supply chain will change. In other
words, cost allocations might be affected by the new cost distribution over the set of all
processes even if just one single process increases its cost. If this does not happen, it means
that the variation of cost allocations solely depends on the process whose cost has increased;
then, we say that cost allocations are process independent. As a consequence, this property
implies that the firms can transparently relate their cost variations to the processes with
increased costs; as such, they may make an official grievance against firms involved in those
more costly processes.
Let G 
(
N , P , B, C , v
)
,G ′ 
(
N , P , B, C ′, v
)
,G˜ 
(
N , P , B, C˜ , v
)
,G˜ ′ 
(
N ,
P , B, C˜ ′, v
)
be the cooperative models associated to the cost structures C , C ′, C˜ , C˜ ′. We
assume that C ′ ≥ C , C˜ ′ ≥ C˜ and c′p  cp , c˜′p  c˜p for p ∈ M\{q}. We assume that
c˜′q  c
′
q and cq  c˜q . Then, xi
(
G ′
)
− xi (G)  xi
(
G˜ ′
)
− xi
(
G˜
)
must hold for each i ∈ N .
Property 5: (Weak) unilateral disaggregation stability Lenzen et al. (2007) and Rodrigues
and Domingos (2008) originally discussed the stability of pollution responsibility allocations
due to de-merging of companies over supply chains. Let G  (N , P , B, C , v) be our
cooperative model. As a preliminary step, we formalize disaggregated supply chains with
reference to the original model.
Let P(i) { j ∈ N |(i , j) ∈ P} and R(i) { j ∈ N |( j , i) ∈ P} be the subsets including firms,
who are supplied by i or supply firm i , respectively. Similarly, let Pi and Ri be the subsets
including processes in which firm i is a supplier or firm i is supplied by, respectively. Assume
that firm i disaggregates its activities into two companies i1 and i2. After disaggregation, the
set of firms is modified as N ′  {i1, i2}∪ N\{i}. Then, the new set of processes is composed
by P ′  R(i)×{i1}∪{i2}×P(i)∪(i1, i2)∪P\(Pi ∪Ri ). The new set of environmental costs
C ′ is composed as it follows. First of all, we define c′j i1 : c j i for j ∈ R(i) and c′i2 j , c′i1i2 ≥ 0
where ci j : c′i2 j +c
′
i1i2 for each j ∈ P(i). The last equality is named cost-splitting property.
For the remaining cases, we simply require that c′hk : chk . It is straightforward to think that
disaggregated responsibility situations need a new responsibility matrix, that is B ′.First of all,
such a new responsibility matrix B ′ must have |N| + 1 rows, that is the new number of firms,
and |P| + 1 columns, that is the new number of processes. Such a new responsibility matrix
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might be defined in several ways. We require some reasonable assumption on it. Let h be a
firm participating in the original game and in the disaggregated game. Then it is immediate
to see that h cannot be firms i1, i2, i . For such a firm, we require some consistency property
related to the original responsibility matrix B. Firstly, Bhp  1 with p  (i, j) implies
B ′hp′  1 with p
′  (i2, j); Bhp  1 with p  (j, i) implies B ′hp′  1 with p′  ( j , i1).
Finally B ′hp  Bhp holds if the process p does not contain i1, i2.
The above conditions ensure that, if a firm is responsible for processes involving the firm
i in the original game, is also responsible for associated processes involving i1, i2 after
the disaggregation. The latter means that the disaggregation does not create externalities on
others’ responsibilities for processes. In addition, we require that (i1, i2) /∈ B ′i1 ∩ B
′
i2 ; this
means that, at most, one of the new companies is responsible for the internal process (i1, i2),
due to the disaggregation. If B ′ satisfies both conditions we say that a responsibility matrix
B ′ is B -compatible.
We have defined disaggregated models G ′ 
(
N ′, P ′, B ′, C ′, v
)
from the original model
G  (N , P , B , C , v). The multiplicity of disaggregated models depends on the multiple
ways to split costs and/or on the multiple ways to implement new pollution responsibilities
over supply chains.
Within this context, we say that G  (N , P , B , C , v) satisfies the unilateral disaggre-
gation stability property if there exists a B-compatible responsibility matrix B ′ and, then,
there exists a firm i such that xi1
(
G ′
)
+ xi2
(
G ′
)
> xi (G) for any disaggregated model
G ′ 
(
N ′, P ′, B ′, C ′, v
) (Unilateral Disaggregation Stability). We say that firm i is the
aggregating company and B ′ is the aggregating responsibility matrix. We say that G satisfies
weak unilateral disaggregation stability if x j (G) ≥ x j
(
G ′
) (Weak Unilateral Disaggregation
Stability) for each company j different from i.
Assume that cost allocations satisfy unilateral disaggregation stability. In virtue of the
cost-splitting property, it is straightforward to prove that:
n∑
h1
n∑
k1
chk ≥
n+1∑
h1
n+1∑
k1
c′hk .
Since cost allocations are efficient, we have
n∑
h1
xh(G) 
n∑
h1
n∑
k1
chk 
n+1∑
h1
xh
(
G ′
)

n+1∑
h1
n+1∑
k1
c′hk .
We say that firm i is the aggregating company. It follows that
n∑
h1
xh(G)− xi(G) >
n+1∑
h1
xh
(
G ′
)
− xi1
(
G ′
)
− xi2
(
G ′
)
The last formula implies that xh(G) > xh
(
G ′
)
for some companies h. This means that
there exists, at least, one firm who might consider the disaggregation option as a profitable
one. If each company can get a benefit from disaggregation, then the whole supply chain
can be considered as weakly stable, even if the aggregating firm prefers not to disaggregate
its activities. In addition, if the cost of original game is strictly superior to the cost of the
disaggregated game, there are internal incentives along supply chains to cause disaggrega-
tion. Even if cost allocations satisfy the unilateral disaggregation stability property, internal
resources might still provide incentives to companies, which do not directly demerge, to
collude and cause the disaggregation of the aggregating firm.
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3.2 Additional remarks
The first two properties (Equivalence and Equal Sharing of Extra Pollution) respect fairness
by definition. It must be highlighted that, according to an egalitarianism principle, each
company across a supply chain is granted the same right to pollute (Zhou and Wang 2016).
As such, the total pollution across a supply chain might be increased due to unilateral actions
from individual partners. However, in this case, an egalitarian perspective does not necessarily
imply distributive justice concerning pollution responsibility allocation deriving from extra
pollution (Rose 1990). Within this context, the equal sharing of extra pollution, no free
riding and process independence properties provide additional commitment to substantive
distributive justice.
4 Linear supply chains and pollution responsibility
Here, we specify our model (N , P , B, C , v) in (2) where υ has been already defined in
(1). The specifications deal with the structure of the process set P and of the responsibility
matrices B. A generic process (i , j) represents the production of goods by company i and
the supply of such goods to company j . In the linear supply chain, the set Pi is reduced to
a singleton for each company, at most. This implies that company i is supplying goods or
services to a single supply chain partner. Then a process (i , j) can be identified as an element
of the set of companies. In addition, each process has an environmental cost ci , i+1, which can
be simply expressed by ci . In the context, we can assume that existence of a final company
|N| + 1, which is the company such that P|N |+1  ∅. From company |N|, a process starts and
supplies company |N| + 1. We assume that the final company has no responsibility, that is
characterized by the following assumption B|N |+1  ∅. Because allocations are responsible
compatible by our initial choice, we know that x|N |+1  0. Then, we disregard the last
company |N | + 1 because its cost allocation is null. Therefore the number of processes |P|
is equal to the number of pertinent firms is |N |  n .
Here, we define how the responsibility matrix B is characterized according to environ-
mental supply chain philosophies. In this context, three principles can be employed to solve
the allocation problem. A Local Responsibility principle (LR), according to which each
company i is strictly responsible for the pollution costs, related to the production activities
strictly happening at its premises. An Upstream Responsibility principle (UR), stating that
upstream suppliers (dealing with raw material extraction, sub-component manufacturing and
other energy intensive activities) are responsible not only for pollution happening at their
premises, but can also influence the environmental performance of downstream partners. A
Downstream Responsibility principle (DR), stating that downstream partners in the supply
chain are responsible for the polluting activities happening at upstream suppliers’ premises.
The three above principles can be exemplified by introducing the following responsibility
matrices B. The following diagonal unitary n × n matrix characterizes LR:
B 
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 0 . . . 0
0 1 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
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The UR principle says that player j has the responsibility to participate in pollution
mitigation expenses of each downstream supply chain partner. Then, the following unitary
upper triangular n × n responsibility matrix characterizes the UR principle.
B 
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 1 . . . 1
0 1 . . . 1
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
Similarly, the following unitary lower triangular n×n responsibility matrix characterizes
DR principle.
B 
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 0 . . . 0
1 1 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
1 1 . . . 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
After having defined the structure of process set P and the responsibility matrices B, the
characteristic function, which has been defined in (1), depends just on the set of environmental
costs, that is C . It will assume different forms for each of the three principles. By adopting
the LR principle, the characteristic function (1) turns out to be:
ν1(S) 
∑
i∈S
ci .
Conversely, it will assume the following form if a UR principle is adopted:
ν2(S) 
n∑
i jmin
ci , jmin  minS.
Finally, by adopting a DR principle, the characteristic function will take the following form:
ν3(S) 
jmax∑
i1
ci , jmax  maxS.
Therefore the model (N , P , B, C , v) in (2) can be simplified as (N , C , ν), according to the
shape of the above-mentioned characteristic functions. In the following section, an allocation
rule for the environmental responsibility costs is illustrated. This allocation rule is efficient,
in such a way to ensure that
∑n
i1 xi 
∑n
i1 ci among all the supply chain partners for all
the three games introduced above (N , C , νi ).
5 The Shapley allocation for linear supply chains
Among the possible allocation rules that can be derived from cooperative game theory, the
Shapley value enjoys desirable properties such as efficiency and fairness (Owen 1995). The
game (N , C , ν1) admits a Shapley value xi  ci . The formula can be explicitly expressed
by the following equations:
x1  c1
x2  c2
x3  c3
· · ·  · · ·
xn  cn  0
123
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This particular allocation can be called Local Responsibility Sharing (LRS). For an arbi-
trary company i , if ci  0 then xi  0. In this case, LRS allocation is null for firm i , even
if Bi  ∅. Mathematical results provided in Dong et al. (2012) are helpful to have a closed-
formula for the Shapley value for the game (N , C , ν2). According to such results, (N , C , ν2)
admits a Shapley value which is equivalent to xi 
∑n
si cs/s. The formula can be explicitly
expressed by the following equations:
x1  c1 +
c2
2 +
c3
3 + · · · +
cn
n
 c1 +
c2
2 +
c3
3 + · · · +
cn−1
n−1
x2 
c2
2 +
c3
3 + · · · +
cn
n
 c22 +
c3
3 + · · · +
cn−1
n−1
x3 
c3
3 + · · · +
cn
n
 c33 + · · · +
cn−1
n−1
· · ·  · · ·
xn 
cn
n
 0
This particular allocation can be called Upstream Equal Sharing (UES) cost allocation.
Similarly, thanks to the result provided in Ni and Wang (2007) and Gómez-Rúa (2013), the
game (N , C , ν3) admits a Shapley value, i.e. xi 
∑i
s1 cs/(n − s + 1). The formula can be
explicitly expressed by the following equations:
x1 
c1
n
x2 
c1
n
+ c2
n−1
x3 
c1
n
+ c2
n−1 +
c3
n−2
· · ·  · · ·
xn 
c1
n
+ c2
n−1 +
c3
n−2 + · · · + cn 
c1
n
+ c2
n−1 +
c3
n−2 + · · ·
cn−1
n−1
This particular allocation can be called Downstream Equal Sharing (DES) allocation
method. Here, we verify if LRS, DES and UES allocation rules satisfy the desirable properties
introduced in Sect. 3.
Proposition 1 LRS, DES and UES allocation rules satisfy the equivalence property.
Proposition 2 LRS, DES and UES allocation rules satisfy the equal sharing of extra pollution
property.
Proposition 3 LRS, DES and UES allocation rules satisfy the no free riding property.
Proposition 4 LRS, DES, UES cost allocations satisfy the process independence property.
Because the Shapley value is an efficient allocation, then UES cost allocations are efficient.
Proposition 5 LRS allocation rule does not satisfy the unilateral disaggregation stability
property. We assume that cn−1  0 and n > 2. Then, UES allocation rule satisfies unilateral
disaggregation stability property. UES allocation rule satisfies weak unilateral disaggrega-
tion stability.
6 Applications
In order to demonstrate the applicability of the Shapley allocation (and related allocation
rules) to real-world problems, the developed approach has been tested on an example related
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to the dairy supply chain. Dairy supply chains enjoy a very linear structure, in which the
following stakeholders can be identified (Vergé et al. 2013):
– Feed producer, producing animal feed from raw agricultural products;
– Milk Producer, managing lactating animals (generally cows) and obtaining raw milk;
– Processor, performing important operations for converting milk into a product fit for
human consumption (heat treatments and pasteurization) and transforming it into a final
product to be sold onto the market (also taking care of the packaging element);
– Distributor, taking care of the logistical processes throughout the supply chain, involving
cold chain operations;
– Retailer, making the product available to the final consumer.
– Consumers, buying and consuming the final product.
In a typical dairy supply chain, environmental pollution can be characterized through carbon
equivalent emissions (expressed in Kg CO2-eq per Litre). Combining findings from several
sources (Vergé et al. 2013; Thoma et al. 2013; Ormond and Goodman 2015), environmental
impacts (measured in terms of Kg CO2-eq per litre of product) happening at each stage of
the supply chain can be reported as shown in Table 1. For sake of simplicity, pollution costs
might be deemed proportional to these environmental impacts.
The results of the three allocation principles shown in Sects. 3 and 4 (LRS, UES, DES)
to a typical dairy supply chain are shown in the following Table 2. It can be seen how
the three allocation principles provide very different results, allocating different quota of
environmental impacts to different actors. Under the LRS rule, the highest proportion of
environmental impacts (and, therefore, of associated mitigation costs) is assigned to the
Milk Producer, respecting a simple proportionality mechanism. UES and DES rules develop
more complex mechanisms; notably, the DES rule strongly penalizes the Retailer and the
Consumer.
It must be pointed out that the proposed allocation rules might be considered not mutually
exclusive; indeed, convex combinations of these rules might be developed, as shown in
Table 3, where LRS and DES are combined together. This could be done, for instance, in
order to introduce, within a LRS framework, elements of downstream responsibility.
7 Conclusions and future works
This study shed light on normative frameworks for the problem of pollution responsibility
allocation across multi-tier supply chains through cooperative game theory concepts. After a
thorough literature review, the paper has presented a cooperative game theoretical responsi-
Table 1 Environmental impacts
across a typical dairy supply
chain
Emissions (Kg CO2-eq per Litre)
Feed producer 0.284
Milk producer 0.727
Processor 0.129
Distributor 0.108
Retailer 0.091
Final consumer 0.000
Total 1.337
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Table 2 Environmental impact allocation according to LRS, UES, DES rules
Stakeholder Emissions share
(%)
LRS (%) DES (%) UES (%)
Feed producer 21.21 21.24 3.54 55.03
Milk producer 54.34 54.38 14.42 33.78
Processor 9.61 9.65 16.83 6.60
Distributor 8.05 8.08 19.52 3.38
Retailer 6.79 6.81 22.92 1.36
Consumers 0.00 0.00 22.92 0.00
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 3 Hybrid Allocation Rules
Stakeholder Emissions share (%) LRS + DES (50–50) (%) LRS + DES (80–20) (%)
Feed producer 21.21 12.39 17.70
Milk producer 54.34 34.40 46.38
Processor 9.61 13.24 11.08
Distributor 8.05 13.80 10.37
Retailer 6.79 14.86 10.03
Consumers 0 11.46 4.58
bility model for pollution allocation; the paper has detailed the generic model in the case of a
linear supply chain, by selecting three different responsibility principles (namely: Upstream,
Downstream and Local Responsibility) and developing some associated pollution responsi-
bility allocation rules. These rules have been tested against some desirable properties that
have been proposed. Furthermore, a practical application of the introduced cost allocation
rules has been provided in the context of dairy supply chains.
The work proposed in this paper can be further extended in future researches, in order
to overcome some of the limitations that characterize the current approaches. First of all,
the model has been implemented on a simple linear supply chain, in which each company
supplies and receives goods from a single partner; future work could extend the framework
to more complex supply networks, in which multiple companies operate at each tier. Also,
different pollution responsibility schemes and different supply chains structures (including,
for instance, reverse elements, such as theorized by Jacobs and Subramanian 2012) might be
employed in our model. A new set of normative properties could be defined, with the specific
aim to assess the stability of international supply chains, especially against pollution costs
differently perceived and taxed in nonhomogeneous countries.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let C be the set of environmental costs. Let i , j ∈ N be two players such that Bi  B j .
Firstly, we prove that the LRS allocation rule satisfies equivalence. We know that Bi  {i},
B j  { j} by definition of the LRS method. By hypothesis we have i  j . Therefore, the
condition xi  x j is trivially satisfied.
Secondly, we prove that the UES allocation rule satisfies equivalence. In order to introduce
a contradiction, we assume that i < j . Then we have bi , i  1. But b j , i  0. Therefore, we
have that i ∈ Bi\B j  ∅. Then we have Bi  B j , but this is an absurd. By symmetry, we
simply conclude that i  j . Then xi  x j is trivially satisfied.
Thirdly, we prove that the DES method satisfies the equivalence property. Assume that
i < j . Then, we have bi , j  0. However, we have b j , i  1 because i is upstream to j .
Therefore, j ∈ B j\Bi  ∅. Therefore, we have B j  Bi . This is an absurd by hypothesis.
By symmetric arguments we simply conclude that i  j . Therefore xi  x j holds.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let G  (N , P , B, C , v) and G ′ 
(
N , P , B, C ′, v
)
be the two associated cooperative
models where C, C′ be two vectors of environmental costs with C≥C′. We pick two processes
p, q . We define Apq 
{
k ∈ N |bp, k  bq , k  1, c′k > ck
}
.
Firstly, we prove that LRS satisfies the equal sharing of extra pollution. Because the
responsibility matrix is an identity one, then p  q  k. Therefore xk
(
G ′
)
− xk(G) 
xk
(
G ′
)
− xk(G) is satisfied because p  q coincides with k.
Secondly, we prove that UES method satisfies equal sharing of extra pollution. Since the
responsibility matrix is upper triangular, then we have k ≥ p and k ≥ q . Therefore we obtain
the following equalities
x p
(
G ′
)
− x p(G) 
n∑
sp
c′s
s
−
n∑
sp
cs
s

∑
k∈Apq
c′k
k
−
ck
k
xq
(
G ′
)
− xq(G) 
n∑
sq
c′s
s
−
n∑
sq
cs
s

∑
k∈Apq
c′k
k
−
ck
k
.
the two quantities are clearly equal since minApq ≥ max{p, q}.
Thirdly, we prove that DES satisfies equal sharing of extra pollution property. As the
responsibility matrix is upper triangular, then we have maxApq ≥ min{p, q}. Then we
obtain that the following two expressions
x p
(
G ′
)
− x p(G) 
∑
k∈Apq
ck
n−k+1 −
c′k
n−k+1
xq
(
G ′
)
− xq(G) 
∑
k∈Apq
ck
n−k+1 −
c′k
n−k+1
are equal.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Let G  (N , P , B, C , v) and G ′ 
(
N , P , B, C ′, v
)
be the two associated cooperative
models where C, C′ are the two sets of environmental costs with C′≥C. Let i ∈ N . Suppose
that c′j  c j for j such that bi , j  1.
Firstly, we prove that the LRS method satisfies the no free riding property. As the respon-
sibility matrix is the identity matrix, from bi , j  1 it thus follows that i  j . Then, we obtain
xi (G )  x j (G )  c j , xi
(
G ′
)
 x j
(
G ′
)
 c
′
j  c j since c
′
j  c j as per initial assumptions.
From the above inequalities it follows that xi
(
G ′
)
 xi (G ). The latter implies that the no
free riding property is satisfied.
We prove that the UES method satisfies no free riding. Because the responsibility matrix
is upper triangular, from bi , j  1 it thus follows that i ≤ j . From the above assumption of
no free riding axiom, we know that c j  c′j for s ≥ i . From the UES method formulae, that
is xi (G) 
∑n
ji c j/ j and xi
(
G ′
)

∑n
ji c
′
j/ j , we imply that xi (G)  xi
(
G ′
)
. Then, the
UES allocation rule satisfies the no free riding property.
Thirdly, we prove that DES satisfies the no free riding property. As the responsibility
matrix is an upper triangular matrix, from bi , j  1 it thus follows that i ≥ j . From the above
assumption, we assume c j  c
′
j if 1 ≤ j ≤ i . From the following DES allocation rules
xi (G) 
i∑
j1
c j
n − j + 1 xi
(
G ′
)

i∑
j1
c′j
n − j + 1
we imply that xi (G)  xi
(
G ′
)
. Therefore the DES method satisfies the no free riding property.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let C , C ′, C, C˜ ′ be four cost vectors. Let G  (N , P , B, C , v), G ′ 
(
N , P , B, C ′, v
)
,
G˜ 
(
N , P , B, C˜ , v
)
and G˜ ′ 
(
N , P , B, C˜ , v
)
be the four cooperative models asso-
ciated to the cost structures C , C ′, C˜ , C˜ ′. We assume that C ′ ≥ C , C˜ ′ ≥ C˜ . In addition
c′j  c j , c˜
′
j  c˜ j for j ∈ N\{k} and c˜′k  c′k and ck  c˜k . Pick j  k.
We prove that LRS satisfies the process independence property. Then x j
(
G ′
)
− x j (G) 
c′j−c j  0 and x j
(
G˜ ′
)
−x j
(
G˜
)
 c˜′j−c˜ j  0 by hypothesis. The equality c
′
k−c˜
′
k  ck−c˜k
or c′k − ck  c˜
′
k − c˜k holds by hypotheses. It is straightforward to see that xk
(
G ′
)
−xk(G) 
c′k − ck and xk
(
G˜ ′
)
− xk
(
G˜
)
 c˜′k − c˜k .
We prove that UES satisfies process independence. Pick j  k. From the definition of
usual UES allocation rules, we can easily compute the following differences
x j
(
G ′
)
− x j (G) 
n∑
s j
c′s
s
−
n∑
s j
cs
s
, x j
(
G˜ ′
)
− x j
(
G˜
)

n∑
s j
c˜′s
s
−
n∑
s j
c˜s
s
.
We assume that k < j ; then, the two above quantities are equal to 0 since c′s  cs ,
c˜′s  c˜s . We assume that k ≥ j ; then, each addend in the above quantities is equal to 0 made
exception for the ones indexed by k. These two addends in the two different above sums are
(c′k/k) − (ck/k) and (c˜′k/k)−(c˜k/k) and they are equal by initial hypothesis.
We leave to the reader the proof for the DES allocation rule, which can be obtained
following a very similar procedure.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Let G  (N , C , v) be the associated cooperative model. After the disaggregation of company
i , let call G ′ the new game. The new set of environmental costs C ′ includes the following
components: c′h  ch for h  i1, i2 and ci  c
′
i2 +c
′
i2 c
′
i +c
′
i+1. The matrix B
′ is a square
matrix with order n + 1.The matrix B ′ is an LR matrix if the original responsibility matrix is
an LR matrix and B ′ is an UR matrix if the original responsibility matrix is an UR matrix.
In both cases it is straightforward to prove that B ′ is B –compatible.
We prove that the LRS allocation rule does not satisfy disaggregation stability. Let i be the
firm who disaggregates. Firstly, i1 /∈ B ′i2  {i + 1}. By definition of LRS allocations, we have
the following formulas xi (G)  ci , xi1
(
G ′
)
 xi
(
G ′
)
 c′i  c
′
i1 and xi2
(
G ′
)
 xi+1
(
G ′
)

c′i+1  c
′
i2 . By hypothesis,ci  c
′
i1 + c
′
i2 ; then, the inequality becomes xi (G)  xi1
(
G ′
)
+
xi2
(
G ′
)
. Therefore, the LRS allocation rule does not satisfy the unilateral disaggregation
stability property.
We prove that UES allocation rule satisfies the disaggregation stability. First, we have that
i1  i /∈ Bi2  {i + 1, i + 2, . . . , n}. The UES cost allocation for firm i , who disaggregates,
is xi (G) 
∑n
si
cs
s

∑n
si+1
cs
s
+ cii . UES cost allocations for firms i1 and i2 are
xi1
(
G ′
)

n+1∑
si1
c′s
s

n+1∑
si
c′s
s

n+1∑
si+1
c′s
s
+
c′i
i
, xi2
(
c′
)

n+1∑
si2
c′s
s

n+1∑
si+1
c′s
s
.
By simple computations we have
xi1
(
G ′
)
+ xi2
(
G ′
)
− xi (G) 
n+1∑
si+2
2c′s
s
+
2c′i+1
i + 1
−
n∑
si+1
cs
s
+
c′i
i
−
ci
i

n∑
si+1
(2c′s+1
s + 1
−
cs
s
)
+
2c′i+1
i + 1
+
c′i
i
−
ci
i
. (5)
Let us assume that i  n, n − 1. We rewrite the generic addend of the first sum in the
right hand side of (5) in the following way:
2c′s+1
s + 1
−
cs
s

scs − cs
s(s + 1)

(s − 1)cs
s(s + 1)
≥ 0
since c′s+1  cs for s ≥ i + 1 ≤ n. Then the first sum in the right hand side of (5) contains
the addend (n − 2)cn−1/((n − 1)n) since i + 1 ≤ n − 1. The last above quantity is strictly
positive because cn−1 > 0 and n > 2 by hypothesis. Therefore, the first term in the right
hand side of (5) is strictly positive. After simple computations, the algebraic difference of
the last three remaining addends in the right hand part of equality (5) can be reworked as
follows:
c′i
i
+
2c′i+1
i + 1
−
ci
i

c′i
i
+
2c′i+1
i + 1
−
c′i + c
′
i+1
i

2c′i+1
i + 1
−
c′i+1
i

2c′i+1i − c
′
i+1(i + 1)
(i + 1)i

c′i+1i − c
′
i+1
(i + 1)i

c′i+1(i − 1)
(i + 1)i
≥ 0
Therefore we have xi1
(
G ′
)
+ xi2
(
G ′
)
> xi (G). Then UES satisfies unilateral disag-
gregation stability. In addition, we prove UES allocation rule satisfies weak unilateral
disaggregation stability. We, more significantly, focus on the firms j such that j < i . Then,
let us consider just i > 1. If i  1 there are no firms located upstream to i  1. Therefore,
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we again assume i1  i and i2  i + 1. For such companies, we have the following cost
allocations
x j (G) 
n∑
s j
cs
s

i−1∑
j≤s
cs
s
+
ci
i
+
n−1∑
i+1≤s
cs
s
(6)
x j
(
G ′
)

n+1∑
s j
c′s
s

i−1∑
j≤s
c′s
s
+
c′i1
i
+
c′i2
i + 1
+
n∑
i+2≤s
c′s
s
(7)
By hypothesis, c′s  cs if j ≤ s < i and c
′
s+1  cs if i + 1 ≤ s ≤ n. By virtue of the
previous equalities, it is straightforward to prove that the first addend in the right-hand side
of formula (6) is equal to the first addend in the right-hand side of formula (7). If i  n, the
third addend in the right-hand side of formula (6) is strictly greater than the fourth addend in
the right-hand side of formula (7) since cn−1 > 0.3 It thus follows that x j (G) > x j
(
G ′
)
if
and only if ci/i ≥ (c′i/i) + (c′i+1/(i + 1)). By cost-splitting formula, i.e. ci  c
′
i + c
′
i+1, then
the inequality becomes c′i/i + c
′
i+1/i ≥ c
′
i/i + c
′
i+1/(i + 1) . The last inequality is true; it is
a strict inequality if c′i+1  0 or it turns to be an equality if c
′
i+1  0. We can conclude that
x j (G) > x j
(
G ′
)
. Let us assume that j > i . Firstly, we have the following inequalities:
xn(G)  xn
(
G ′
)
 0, xn−1(G) 
cn−1
n − 1
>
cn
n

c′n
n
 xn−1
(
G ′
)
because cn > 0. So we focus our attention on firms, which are different from n − 1, n.
As usual, UES allocations are x j (G) 
∑n−1
s j cs/s and x j
(
G ′
)

∑n
s j+1 c′s/s. The first
sum contains the addend cn−1/(n − 1) and the second sum contains the addend cn−1/n.
Therefore, it follows that x j (G) > x j
(
G ′
)
for j > i and j  n − 1, n. UES allocation rules
satisfy weak unilateral disaggregation stability.
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